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In recent years there has been an upsurge in violent attacks conducted by pairs of individuals who have undergone a shared
process of radicalisation. Violent dyads remain a relatively understudied phenomenon. Using a relational approach, this article
analyses the unique character of dyadic radicalisation and how it differs from instances of lone actor or group-based terrorism.
It draws on a number of recent case studies, analysing instances of non-kin, fraternal, and spousal dyads. Its principal case
study is a failed attack in Germany in 2006, based on a range of documentary sources as well as an interview with one of the
perpetrators.
Keywords: Lone Actor Radicalisation; Terrorism; Radicalisation; Violent Dyads
Acknowledgement:  This project received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme, under grant
agreement no 608354. We would also like to extend our gratitude to research assistants Thomas Vestergaard and Christian
Christoffersen, Oluf Gøtzsche-Astrup, and Oisin Mac Aodha, as well as to the anonymous reviewers  at IJCV for insightful feed-
back.
The recent upsurge in violent attacks by lone-actor terrorists
has justifiably garnered much political, academic, and popu-
lar attention. However, nestled amongst these cases, there
have been several attacks conducted by radicalised dyads:
pairs of  people who have largely  radicalised  together  and
proceeded to carry out joint violent attacks such as the Bos-
ton  Marathon  bombing  in  2013 and  the  San  Bernardino
shooting in 2015. The admittedly rare, but periodic recur-
rence of these attacks merits further analysis. The field of so-
cial psychology contains exhaustive research on dyads, but it
is  mostly  focused  on  dyadic  relationships  within  couples
(Collins and Read 1990) or family environments (Jenkins et
al. 2012). Criminologists have also focused on the formation
of criminal dyads (Kandel, Davies, and Baydar 1990). There
is little research focusing on radicalised dyads that prepare
or actually launch violent attacks, save for a brief discussion
of “family pair terrorists” in an updated edition of McCauley
and Moskalenko’s  Friction (2017) and the inclusion by Gill
et al. of “isolated dyads” in their quantitative study of lone-
actor terrorists (2014). 
This  article  draws  on  lone-actor  radicalisation  research
(Malthaner  et  al.  2017;  Gill, Horgan, and  Deckert  2014;
Lindekilde, Malthaner, and O’Connor 2018; Fredholm 2016;
Spaaij 2011; Joosse 2015) and related literature on small
group radicalisation (della  Porta  1995; Wiktorowicz  2005;
Malthaner and Waldmann 2014; Sageman 2008). Yet, nei-
ther of these approaches is specifically designed to address
the patterns of  radicalisation inherent to dyads. Borrowing
from the work of Georg Simmel (1964), this article argues
that  the  relational  composition  of  dyads  sets  them apart
from terrorist cells (which contain three or more individuals)
and, at the same time, differentiates them from lone-actor
radicalization. Dyads, in  other  words, represent  a  specific
pattern of relationships – within the dyad as well as between
the dyad and its social environment – which shapes radicali-
sation and attack preparation. 
@ Francis O’Connor: Francis.OConnor@eui.eu
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Adopting a relational approach to analysing radicalisation
(Malthaner and Lindekilde 2017) and drawing, in particular,
on recent works that have adapted relational perspectives to
research lone-actor  terrorism (Malthaner  et  al. 2017;  Lin-
dekilde,  O’Connor,  and  Schuurman  2017;  Lindekilde,
Malthaner, and O’Connor 2018), this article seeks to identify
the  relational  configurations  and  mechanisms  that  shape
processes  of  dyadic  radicalisation, pointing  out  dynamics
they share with group and lone-actor radicalisation, as well
as mechanisms specific to violent dyads. We argue that while
dyads  display  a  number  of  similarities  with  lone  actors  –
such as peripheral positions within broader radical milieus or
movements and the particular  function of  role-models  en-
gaged in explicit and implicit calls to action – it is the intense
relationship  between  the  two  individuals  involved  in  the
process that not only contributes to reinforcing and consoli-
dating radicalisation but also facilitates the shift from radical
attitudes towards planning and executing a violent  attack.
Similar  to  lone  actors, radicalised  dyads  are  rarely  com-
pletely  isolated, but  are  to  varying  degrees  embedded  in
broader milieus and interact with radical activists in various
ways (see Schuurman et al. 2018; Malthaner and Lindekilde
2017);  thus, while  they  carry  out  violent  attacks  on their
own, their isolation is always relative rather than absolute. 
The article is based, firstly, on one in-depth case study of
dyadic radicalisation – an attempted terrorist attack in Ger-
many in 2006 – for which the authors have obtained exten-
sive  data  from  primary  and  restricted  sources,  including
court  documents and an interview with one of the impris-
oned perpetrators, as well  as multiple open sources. Sec-
ondly, in order to validate the findings derived from that case,
the authors also assess the identified mechanisms in a num-
ber of other cases based on an extensive secondary source
review of the radicalisation patterns of the Boston Marathon
bombers and the San Bernardino attackers. The article thus
addresses instances of non-kin dyads, spousal dyads, and
sibling dyads. It  begins with a brief  conceptual discussion
and literature review, followed by a summary of the method-
ology used. It then discusses in detail the initiation of the
dyad and its radicalisation in the German case study, before
concluding  with  an analysis  of  the mechanisms identified
and how they differ from other cases of dyadic radicalisation.
1. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review
In the interests of conceptual clarity, a number of key con-
cepts that recur in this article should be explained. Firstly,
radicalisation is understood as a process at the individual or
group-level,  characterised by a shift  towards violent reper-
toires of action and the adoption of frames of interpretation
that condone, legitimise, and promote acts of political vio-
lence. Radicalisation is a composite process that can and
should be disaggregated into sub-processes of cognitive rad-
icalisation (perceptions/identities/beliefs), shifts in practices
and patterns of activism, and relational pathways (concate-
nations of relational patterns and dynamics of interaction),
which are intertwined and interact in multiple, complex ways,
and should neither be analytically conflated nor isolated. The
authors concur with the conceptualisation of political radical-
isation as occurring across a spectrum ranging from the indi-
vidual to the collective level of organisations and movements
(McCauley and Moskalenko 2017, 2008). Rather than rep-
resenting entirely distinct processes, lone-actor and dyadic
radicalisation thus share many mechanisms with collective
forms of radicalisation (Lindekilde, Malthaner, and O’Connor
2018). Secondly, the term radicalised dyads refers to pairs
of closely interacting individuals who have undergone an (at
least partly) shared process of radicalisation, plan together,
and attempt or actually carry out a violent attack. Recent re-
search has defined lone actors according to three key fea-
tures: they conduct the attack on an individual basis, do not
belong to a terrorist organisation or armed group, and do not
operate on direct orders from or under the direct influence of
a leader or group (Malthaner et al. 2017). Similarly to lone
actors, radicalised dyads are always only relatively autono-
mous in  relation  to  radical  milieus  and terrorist  organisa-
tions.  It  has also been suggested that  “the psychology of
radicalization in a family pair [or dyad] is likely closer to that
of a lone wolf  than to that of  a traditional terrorist  group
member” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2017, 255). 
Dyads represent a specific relational configuration, charac-
terized by an intense relationship between the involved indi-
viduals and resulting in distinct radicalisation patterns. Writ-
ing  about  dyads,  Simmel  argued:  “everyday  experiences
show the specific character that a relationship attains by the
fact that only two elements participate in it. A common fate
or enterprise, an agreement or secret between the two per-
sons, ties each of them in a very different manner than if
even only three have a part in it” (1964, 123). Nevertheless,
we do not argue that the emotionally salient relations be-
tween the two component elements of the dyad are the only
relevant  ones contributing to its radicalisation. Drawing on
existing social movement research, the broader universe of
relations present  in  dyads’ radical  milieus  (Malthaner  and
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Waldmann 2014), in both on- and offline settings, are taken
into consideration (Baaken and Schlegel 2017).
Our definition of dyads excludes cases where two attackers
realise an attack that was conceived in cohort  with, or by
others. Accordingly, the shooting attack on an exhibition of
cartoons depicting caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in
Garland, Texas, is not included because, although the shoot-
ing was conducted by two attackers, it was a plot conceived
and prepared by a small autonomous cell of three individu-
als (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Hughes 2017). Contrived oper-
ational dyads formed by a third party for the logistical pur-
poses of an attack are also excluded. The killing of an elderly
priest in Normandy in July 2016 by a pair of ISIS sympathis-
ers  is  therefore  excluded (Rubin  and Nossiter  2016). The
perpetrators were radicalised separately prior to the attack
and introduced to one another online by a Syrian-based ISIS
recruiter only days prior to the attack (Digiacomi 2016). 
Adopting  a  relational  approach to  radicalisation  focuses
attention “on interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit,
or channel collective violence and connect it with nonviolent
politics” (Tilly  2003, 20). Radicalisation  is  seen  as being
shaped and driven by patterns of interaction between and
within individuals, groups, and their social environment. Fo-
cusing on interpersonal dynamics to analyse lone-actor and
dyadic radicalisation might seem paradoxical. Yet, the isola-
tion  and enclosure  of  dyads is  a  fundamentally  relational
process (Malthaner and Lindekilde 2017). In that respect,
this article makes use of the processes and mechanisms ap-
proach which has become widely applied in the broader so-
cial movement literature (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2008).
Thus, radicalisation  can be  disaggregated into  concatena-
tions of mechanisms, which vary according to the relational
configurations of the settings in which they occur. Some of
the principal mechanisms of lone-actor radicalisation identi-
fied in recent research include: unfreezing (the weakening of
restraining social ties), moral shocks, indirect encouragement
cues (statements or events perceived as encouraging an in-
dividual to act), and encapsulation (“active” social isolation)
(Malthaner et al. 2017). Importantly, in the case of lone ac-
tors and dyads the move toward action can take place out-
side of  direct  contacts  or  interactions with  organised net-
works. These mechanisms are shaped by their specific social
environments and can take slightly  different  forms and/or
occur in varying chronological order.
2. Methodology
The cases of radicalised dyads examined for this paper were
selected from a larger dataset (N=140) of lone-actor extrem-
ists and dyads compiled for a collaborative, EU-funded re-
search project on lone actor terrorists (PRIME, 2014–2017).
Criteria  for  case  selection  included  the  definition  of  radi-
calised dyads stated above,  variation  in the type of  dyad
(non-kin, spousal, and sibling dyads), political relevance as
well  as the accessibility  of high-quality data. The principal
case study at the centre of our analysis is a radicalised dyad
of two Lebanese students – for whom we use the pseudo-
nyms “Ahmad” and “Hassan” – who attempted to carry out a
terrorist attack in Germany in 2006. The case study draws on
restricted documents, including court proceedings, as well as
an in-depth interview with one of the perpetrators, which was
conducted in collaboration with a research project at Biele-
feld University, as well as openly accessible sources. To al-
low for a comparative analysis of patterns of radicalisation,
we combine an in-depth case study with insights from two
further cases, namely the brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev (the Boston Marathon bombers), and the spouses
Syed Riswan Farook and Tashfeen Malik (responsible for the
San Bernardino attack). Research on these cases was based
on an extensive review of open sources (government reports,
newspaper reports, and scholarly publications). The limits of
this case selection should be obvious: as a small-N compar-
ative case study its purpose is primarily explorative, seeking
to identify relational configurations and mechanisms of radi-
calisation which, while able to inform the analysis of radi-
calised dyads in a broader sense, are as such not generalis-
able across ideology (all  our cases involve Islamist adher-
ence), time (all cases are after 2005), and geographical set-
ting (all cases are from Western Europe or North America).
Thus, further research is needed to specify the generalisabil-
ity of the conclusions.
The assembled case material was analysed in two stages.
First, in-depth analysis of our primary German case data was
conducted. The data was coded deductively  (including the
data obtained in the semi-structured interview with one of
the  perpetrators), with  particular  attention paid  to  the  di-
achronic presence and/or absence of established relational
concepts  and  mechanisms  in  the dyad. We also  afforded
close attention to the way personality traits shaped social
ties with larger radical milieus or movements. All the chrono-
logically identifiable data points were placed in a timeline,
permitting the complex ways in which the dyadic radicalisa-
tion unfolded to be disentangled by means of process trac-
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ing. Subsequently, the mechanisms of radicalisation identi-
fied in the primary case were compared with those of the two
secondary cases, providing an opportunity to assess the ro-
bustness of patterns of dyadic radicalisation.
3. Case Study: The Attempted Bombings of Commuter
Trains in Germany, 2006
In July 2006, two Lebanese students, “Ahmad” and “Has-
san”, each deposited a suitcase containing an explosive de-
vice on commuter trains close to one of Germany’s biggest
cities. Due to errors in their construction, the devices failed
to  explode  and  no  casualties  resulted.  Both  perpetrators
were subsequently arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison
terms.
Ahmad was twenty years old when he carried out the at-
tack. His family had been internally displaced during the civil
war in Lebanon, and lived in relatively disadvantaged circum-
stances in a northern Lebanese city. The family is known to
have very stringent religious beliefs and a number of his sib-
lings have been involved in the Salafi jihadist movement Fa-
tah al-Islam (Doc2: 4–5, 182, 183; Doc1, 7). Notwithstand-
ing their general scepticism towards the “West”, the family
encouraged Ahmad to obtain university qualifications in Ger-
many. He attended a number of language courses in Ger-
many  before  being  accepted  to  a  university  preparatory
course to study engineering in northern Germany. He had an
older brother living in Sweden, with whom he became partic-
ularly close while living in Germany. His brother held views
sympathetic to jihadism. In other words, Ahmad experienced
consistent  radical  Salafi  jihadist  socialisation  both  before
and during his period of residence in Germany.
Ahmad did not adjust well to his new environment in Ger-
many. His academic performance was unsatisfactory and he
had to repeat one semester of his preparatory programme
(Doc1: 10). Ahmad established a friendship with other Mus-
lim students in his student residence, and they established
an informal prayer room in the building’s basement. However,
Ahmad’s strict religious views made it difficult for him to set-
tle in Germany. These included considering all photos of peo-
ple as haram, strong opposition to listening to music, refusal
to mingle with women, and not watching football. He only
wore what he believed to be traditional Islamist clothing. As a
result of these self-imposed strictures he spent much time
alone in his room (Doc2: 6, 12, 158). He spent many hours
on the internet perusing jihadi websites, and composed po-
ems lauding jihad; one of these stated that jihad was the
only way to “destroy the roots of humiliation” of the Muslim
world. He developed an intense hatred of the United States,
viewing Americans as unbelievers occupying Iraq who had to
be expelled at all costs (Doc2: 14). One fellow student de-
scribed him as utterly obsessed with armed jihad and the
mujahedeen: “his body was here, but in his head he always
was in the lands of jihad – in Iraq, Palestine” (Doc2: 163). Ji-
had was not merely theoretical for Ahmad, he wanted to go
there and fight (Doc2: 163). He chided male Muslim friends
in the student residence for what he argued was their lax ob-
servation of Islamic norms. He organised small get-togethers
in  the  basement  with  fellow  Muslim  students,  where  he
showed violent jihadist videos. These included ones showing
the execution of hostages, which he argued was legitimate
(Doc2: 15, 16). This resulted in many of his fellow residents
avoiding discussions with him about religion and politics. The
extreme unease Ahmad experienced in a culturally alien con-
text is common amongst many religiously minded young emi-
grants. Similar developments can be observed in the case of
the “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Hider
2011) or  the famous historic  case of  Sayyid  Qutb  in  the
1950s (Qutb 2010). In analytical terms, it can be viewed as
a form of  “unfreezing” that  occurs when an individual be-
comes “disconnected from everyday  routines and relation-
ships” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2017, 85). McCauley and
Moskalenko go on to suggest that “loss of connection and
status leaves an individual with less to lose in radical action,
including violence” (2014, 82).
Ahmad was enraged by the publication of the Mohammed
cartoons in Danish newspapers in 2006. Their  publication
outraged large sections of Islamic society – not only those
with Salafi jihadist leanings (Ramsay and Marsden 2015) –
and has been cited as a justification for multiple jihadist at-
tacks in Europe and further afield in recent years.1 Ahmad at-
tended a  demonstration against  the  caricatures  in  Kiel  in
February 2006, where he played a prominent role, even tak-
ing charge of a megaphone at one point. In class at univer-
sity  he  advocated  the  burning  of  Danish  flags  in  protest
against  the  cartoons  and began to  ignore a  teacher  who
challenged him on the issue (Doc2: 26, 192). The cartoons
were the issue which propelled him from the realm of radical
belief to the need to take action (Doc1: 15). They can be
considered as a moral shock, a mechanism generating a po-
litical awakening or a commitment to actively address a par-
1 Specifically the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices (Callimachi and Yard-
ley 2015), the axe attack on Kurt Westergaard, the failed parcel bomb at-
tack in Copenhagen (Lindekilde, Malthaner and O’Connor 2018), the shoot-
ing attack by Omar el-Hussein in Copenhagen (Malthaner et al. 2017), and
the Garland shooting (Berger 2015).
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ticular wrong (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Many people expe-
rience moral shocks and become convinced of a need to act;
but the initial impetus will  often dissipate before action is
actually taken. This seems to have been the case with Ah-
mad, as he took no concrete steps to prepare an attack until
he  met  Hassan. While  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  Ahmad
could have proceeded to carry out a violent attack on his
own, the arrival  of  Hassan clearly  constituted an enabling
factor for the subsequent shift from radical attitudes to vio-
lent  action several  months later. Hassan  corroborated Ah-
mad’s  beliefs  and supported and participated in  planning
and preparation for the attack. Their commitment to carry out
violence, in other words, started with the formation of their
dyadic relationship.
Hassan was born and raised in Lebanon and also moved
to Germany to study. He was doing a language course when
he first contacted Ahmad. While less is known about Has-
san’s  family  background  or  political  perspectives, Hassan
came into contact with Ahmad through his cousin, a member
of Fatah al-Islam, and was known to sympathise with jihadist
ideas to a certain extent before leaving for Germany (Doc2:
28). But there is no evidence to suggest that Hassan had
ever  considered  participation  in  jihadist  political  violence
prior  to  encountering  Ahmad.  Although  Ahmad’s  religious
convictions hindered participation in student life in Germany,
he did have some Muslim friends and acquaintances in his
student residence. In contrast, Hassan was largely isolated in
Germany, thus potentially  explaining why he contacted Ah-
mad, who lived five hundred kilometres away. Shortly after
this initial contact, in April 2006, Hassan visited Ahmad and
stayed with him for a week. Although the visit was brief, they
quickly became very close friends, with Ahmad telling his fel-
low residents that Hassan was a “true friend” (Doc2: 29).
During this brief period, the pair decided to launch an attack
together in Germany with the objective of killing many people
(Doc1: 15), thus highlighting how rapidly  specific  political
sympathies can be transformed into a commitment to politi-
cal  violence. Similarly short  but intense radicalisation pro-
cesses have been observed in cases of  foreign fighter  re-
cruitment (Lindekilde, Bertelsen, and Stohl 2016) and lone-
actor violence.
All  available  data suggests that  Hassan had a  relatively
passive personality. His flatmates and acquaintances all de-
scribed him as polite  and pleasant, but  passive, insecure
and indecisive. He was also  reported as being withdrawn,
spending a lot of time on his own in his room browsing the
internet. They formed the impression that he was somebody
who looked to others for direction (Doc2: 145–147) – the
polar  opposite  to his  domineering, self-assured friend Ah-
mad. They thus seemed to occupy quite distinct roles in the
dyadic relationship, Ahmad leading and Hassan following. To
the extent that our data allows us to assess intra-dyad dy-
namics, Hassan appears to have been generally deferential
to Ahmad and to have complied with Ahmad’s plans for the
bombing (Doc2: 11, 28, 145-147).2 Hassan quickly began
to view Ahmad as a mentor on account of his greater knowl-
edge of Islam and his assertive demeanour (Doc2: 11). Has-
san appears to have held radical Islamist beliefs and con-
doned violent jihad against the enemies of Islam before he
came to Germany (Doc1, 16). Yet, according to his own ac-
count it was Ahmad who convinced him to carry out a joint
attack. Although this narrative of manipulation is self-serving
and possibly  oversimplified, it  is  consistent  with other  ac-
counts  of  the duo’s  personalities  and observed behaviour
(Doc2: 195-198). Ahmad seems to have made use of his
greater familiarity with Islamic doctrine to emphasise their
personal responsibility as Muslims to avenge the Danish car-
toons. He  reinforced  these  efforts  by  sending  or  showing
Hassan many violent videos from the conflict in Iraq, depict-
ing atrocities against Muslims, and by referencing fatwas by
Salafi jihadist scholars (Doc1: 17; Doc2: 78). He particularly
emphasised a fatwa by Abu Mohammad Al Maqdisi that he
had found online, which specifically called for action in the
West to avenge the cartoons – and had earlier convinced Ah-
mad of  his own personal responsibility  to engage in jihad
and attack western targets (Doc2: 28). They then immedi-
ately proceeded to research online how to build a bomb, fol-
lowing detailed instructions they found on a website (Doc1:
17). The attack in the West was not conceived as the ulti-
mate objective of their jihadist trajectories but rather as a
means to demonstrate their radical credentials so that they
could subsequently travel to Iraq and join the jihad there. 
The tendency toward detachment from broader communi-
ties and the weakening of ties outside of the dyad is a key
feature  characterising  dyadic  radicalisation.  The  intimate
bonds of the dyad bestow great emotional salience upon the
relationship between the two actors, as Simmel  observed:
“precisely the fact that each of the two knows that he can
2 It is worth mentioning that in an interview with Ahmad in prison, he re-
jected this understanding of the dynamic and presented himself as the vic-
tim of manipulation by the wilier Hassan. While it is important to take this
into consideration, the court – and the authors of this study – considered
this narrative to be a self-serving, potentially even self-deceiving, interpreta-
tion of the dynamics between them, which is not supported by the available
facts from other sources.
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depend only upon the other and on nobody else, gives the
dyad a special consecration” (Simmel 1964, 135). After Ah-
mad met  Hassan, he  began  to  distance  himself  from his
friends  and housemates  in  the  student  residence. Ahmad
dismissed  one  particular  friend  claiming  that  he  “had  no
trust in him any more” and “needed to keep a distance from
him”. Other housemates also observed that following Has-
san’s visit, Ahmad “lost  interest in them” (Doc2: 200). Al-
though, they lived in different cities, the pair kept in close in-
ternet  contact. Ahmad sent  Hassan many links to instruc-
tional  and propaganda  videos, to  maintain  his  motivation
and help prepare the attack (Doc1: 19; Doc2: 37, 38, 209).
This prioritisation of one set of social ties – to one another –
resembles  the  tendency  to  ideological  encapsulation  and
amplification described in the literature on small group vio-
lence (della Porta 2013, chapters 4 and 7).
Although it was Ahmad who initially convinced Hassan of
the idea of a joint attack, Hassan then seemed to have fully
embraced the idea. This confirms the transformative impact
of the dyadic relationship on the two individuals. After Has-
san returned from his visit to Ahmad, he continued to engage
in preparations alone, seeking further bomb-making instruc-
tions  online  and  looking  for  theological  justifications
amongst the fatwas of Salafi jihadist clerics. He also scoped
out potential attack sites and contacted a former classmate
in his home country, who forwarded him an extensive list of
jihadist  websites. He actively  distributed jihadist  materials,
too,  many  of  which  addressed  the  Mohammed  cartoons
(Doc1: 20). Thus, Hassan quickly became an equal co-con-
spirator rather than just a reluctant participant.
The death of the jihadist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
Iraq on 7 June 2006 precipitated Ahmad’s decision to carry
out the attack, providing him with an ulterior motive to justify
the planned bombing. Ahmad was in class when he got news
of Zarqawi’s death and fled the room visibly distressed. In a
handwritten document found during the subsequent investi-
gation, Ahmad attributed responsibility for Zarqawi’s death to
US President George W. Bush and swore to avenge the killing
(Doc1: 12, 13; Doc2: 14, 16). Ahmad subsequently went to
stay with Hassan for about two weeks to prepare the attack.
During  this  period, they  carefully  purchased  the  required
components in different hardware stores and continued to
research  bomb-making  techniques. They  planned  to  plant
two bombs targeting civilians, and booked flights to then im-
mediately return to Lebanon, from where they hoped to make
their way to Iraq to join the jihad in person.
4. Mechanisms of Radicalisation in Dyads
4.1. Dyad Initiation
Many dyads are characterised by an imbalance of internal
power,  with one figure  dominating and the other  taking a
more passive role (Humphreys, Weyant, and Sprague 2003).
In the case of radicalising dyads, this can correspond with
power disparities existing in broader society, such as those
often found between husband and wife or between older and
younger siblings. McCauley and Moskalenko argue that such
power disparities render the weaker of the two an “extension
of the stronger [rather] than an equal partner” (2017, 255).
Such a power disparity apparently existed in the investigated
German dyad,  with Ahmad directing the admittedly  willing
Hassan. However, one should avoid generalisations, as the
seemingly more deferential of the duo can often exert subtle
forms of power and influence. Moreover, even in an asym-
metrical dyadic relationship the two sides are connected by
strong  mutual  dependencies  and  the  seemingly  dominant
role  of  one individual requires (and is constituted by) the
recognition and support of the other. Or put differently: as is
clear from the German case, without someone to affirm the
righteousness  of  an  attack,  the  dominant  individual  in  a
dyad might not be capable of the step from radical beliefs to
actually conduct an attack. It is the particular characteristics
of the dyadic relationship – rather than individual personali-
ties and propensities – that create and define the roles of
both individuals and drive and shape radicalisation. In the
case of the Tsarnaev brothers, it was commonly presumed
that the older, more devout and physically imposing Tamer-
lan  convinced  his  younger  more  susceptible  brother,
Dzhokhar,  to  go  along  with  his  violent  plot.  However,  in-
depth  journalistic  investigation  revealed  that  the  younger
brother  was far  more prone to risk-taking,  actively  investi-
gated bomb-making techniques, and through his marijuana
dealing  financed some of  their  preparatory  steps (Jacobs,
Filipov, and Wen 2013). 
Similarly, in the case of the San Bernardino shooters it is
not easy to identify a dominant or passive personality. Farook
married  Malik  in  2013 after  meeting  on a  match-making
website for Muslims. One might assume that a marriage be-
tween Salafi Muslims, particularly one with a newly migrated
wife (Malik), could be characterised by the dominance of the
male figure (Farook). Yet, Malik is known to have had radical
religious views prior to encountering Farook online, abandon-
ing her own family’s syncretic Sufi infused Islam for the puri-
tanical Wahhabism she adopted while living in Saudi Arabia
(Finnegan 2016). She played an active part  in the attack
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and their partnership was the trigger for Farook to revitalise a
previous plot he had abandoned in 2011. That plan was also
conceived with another person, Farook’s neighbour Enrique
Marquez,  a  young  Muslim  convert  (Esquivel,  Rubin,  and
Queally 2017). Malik’s reluctance to carry out an attack on
his own on the previous occasion is revealing; he possessed
the weaponry and a rudimentary plan, but prevaricated after
Marquez withdrew from the plot. Even individuals who are
committed and capable sometimes find it difficult to main-
tain their motivation alone over a prolonged period. Lone ac-
tors who manage to realise well-planned attacks (in contrast
to the more impulsive attacks carried out by certain types of
lone actors  (Lindekilde, O’Connor, and Schuurman 2017),
usually possess high executive functioning. This means that
they are able  to remain goal-focused, maintain motivation
and  exhibit  flexibility  in  light  of  changed  circumstances
(Suchy 2009). In cases of radicalised individuals with lower
executive  functioning, elaborate  attacks  require  the  moral
and psychological support  of at least one other person to
maintain motivation over extended periods.
4.2. Unfreezing
The  unfreezing  mechanism  is  widely  prevalent  across  the
spectrum  of  radicalisation.  According  to  McCauley  and
Moskalenko (2008) it is a three-stage process: first, the indi-
vidual becomes detached from their existing social networks
and ideas. This can come about through normal life events,
such as graduation, migration, marriage, family breakdown,
incarceration, or release from prison. Secondly, the individ-
ual encounters and adopts new ideas and connections, be-
fore thirdly, “refreezing” in a new network with people who
share the same new values. McCauley and Moskalenko also
note that “loss of connection and status leaves an individual
with less to lose in radical action, including violence” (2008,
82). In the case of dyads, the new network is centred on the
dyadic relationship rather than a broader movement. In the
formation of violent dyads, this mechanism plays an impor-
tant, facilitating role as it renders individuals open to new
connections and, at the same time, eliminates other social
ties that could interfere with the dyadic relationship.
In the German case, unfreezing is immediately apparent.
Both attackers were young foreign students who had recently
relocated to a society where they had no social connections
or points of reference. It proved to be a very disorienting ex-
perience for both and when they met, they bonded over their
shared  feelings  of  alienation  and  sympathies  for  jihad
(Doc2: 6, 12). 
In the Boston bombing case, the Tsarnaev brothers experi-
enced  unfreezing  in  related  but  also  distinct  fashions.
Dzhokhar, the younger brother, had been very successful in
high school, in terms of academic performance, sport, and
socially. But when he started his studies at the University of
Dartmouth he had difficulties. He abandoned his wrestling
career, started to sell significant amounts of marijuana, and
struggled academically, barely passing his exams. Although
he was popular, many of his friends were planning to move
away (Jacobs, Filipov, and Wen 2013). He was also trying to
cope with an identity crisis:  he felt  ill  at ease at his local
mosque and he did not share the increasing religiosity of his
mother and brother. He also endured the collective difficul-
ties  his  family  had reconciling  their  Chechen identity  with
American  society  (Gessen  2016). Tamerlan, on  the  other
hand, witnessed the unravelling of his sporting career after
he  was  prohibited  from  entering  the  prestigious  Golden
Gloves boxing competition because his American citizenship
application had been refused on account of his involvement
in an incident of domestic violence. It has been argued that
the collapse of Tamerlan’s sporting ambitions should be un-
derstood as a loss of significance (Kruglanski  et  al  2014,
74). Tamerlan continued to live in the family home, so he wit-
nessed first-hand his parents’ divorce, his sisters’ marital dif-
ficulties  and  their  repeated  court  appearances  for  minor
theft. To make matters worse, he had returned to Dagestan to
visit family, and had come to realise that he did not fit in
there either (Vatchagaev 2013). He was thus thoroughly up-
rooted, feeling fully comfortable neither as a Chechen nor as
an  American.  Through  some  loose  family  connections  he
could have pursued his interest in jihad in the Caucasus re-
gion,  but  never  did  (Hahn  2014,  232–51).  He  justified
bombing the Boston marathon in terms of America’s invasion
and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan rather than the con-
flict in Chechnya and Russia that had affected his own family
for  generations. Indeed, one of  his  last  known statements
was: “I am a Muslim American” (in Gessen 2016, 165). 
The San Bernardino attackers also experienced a degree of
unfreezing. Tashfeen Malik moved to the United States from
Pakistan  in  2014,  the  year  before  the  attack,  but  Syed
Riswan Farook was born and raised an American citizen. Ma-
lik failed to integrate to any extent, deliberately isolating her-
self and spending most of her time alone at home (Finnegan
2016). There is therefore a possibility that the arrival of Malik
into Farook’s life disrupted his existing social relationships,
re-crystallizing them in an emotionally intense jihad-focused
dyad. 
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4.3. Encapsulation
The social isolation of dyads – in the sense of active with-
drawal, for which we use the term “encapsulation” (see also
Lindekilde, Malthaner, and O’Connor 2018) – is, of course,
relative. Although they tend to withdraw from their social en-
vironment while at the same time intensifying their relation-
ship  with  one another,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  any  dyad
could completely detach itself from wider everyday interac-
tions.  Some  also  maintain  weak  and  affiliative  ties  with
broader radical milieus (impersonal relationships of common
identification without any direct communication or interper-
sonal  relationship  (Lindekilde,  Malthaner,  and  O’Connor
2018). One significant element of encapsulation is cognitive
closure, which can be understood as a mechanism by which
“all  the information the militant  activists receive is  filtered
through the group [or dyad]; this process defines their exter-
nal reality by providing shared master frames of meaning”
(della Porta 2013, 252). Particularly in kinship and spousal
dyads, affective focusing – “the progressive reduction of af-
fective ties to small groups of comrades” (della Porta 2013,
243) or in this case, a single partner – can further reinforce
the relationship and create forms of mutual dependence and
influence. 
Across the cases examined here, the relationship patterns
between dyads and their  social environments varied. While
both Ahmad and Hassan maintained school and family con-
tacts, they certainly lessened the intensity of their friendships
outside of the dyad. In the San Bernardino case, the duo left
their  sixth-month-old  child  with  Farook’s  mother  (Stack
2015) while they went to attack his work Christmas party. The
Tsarnaev brothers had close ties to their – admittedly dys-
functional – family and Dzhokhar had a close circle of non-
politicized university friends with whom he socialised regu-
larly (Gessen 2016). Cognitive closure does, however, seem
to be present  across all  the cases. The German dyad im-
mersed itself in radical jihadist literature, reading and watch-
ing  sermons and lectures  by renowned jihadist  preachers.
Ahmad rebuffed all other interpretations of Islam advanced
by other Muslims living in the student residence (Doc1: 13).
Farook and Malik were both interested in jihad before they
met. Farook had already planned another attack with a dif-
ferent partner, while Malik is believed to have adopted mili-
tant jihadist beliefs while living in Saudi Arabia and from fre-
quenting pro-jihadist circles in Pakistan. After meeting on a
Muslim match-making site they discussed their support for ji-
had  before  they  even  met  in  person  (McCauley  and
Moskalenko 2017, 254). Although the elder Tsarnaev brother
had become noticeably more devout in the years leading up
to the attack, the younger Dzhokhar led a decidedly impious
lifestyle with little interest in any form of Islam. On the few
occasions he attended a mosque close to his university he
felt  out  of  place,  and  subsequently  stopped  going  there
(Gessen 2016, 124). In summary, while dyads maintain cer-
tain personal ties in broader social contexts and weak ties
with radical milieus, they tend toward a form of encapsula-
tion where the relational ties between the component parts
dominate all other family and social ties – even the relation-
ship  between  a  first-time  mother  and  her  six-month-old
daughter  in  the  San Bernardino case  (Gishkori  and Craig
2015).
4.4. Moral Shock
The mechanism of moral shock was first theorised by Jasper
and Poulsen (1995) to account for cases where individuals
feel compelled to act even when they were not previously en-
gaged in any political activism and had no existing personal
networks through which they could reach out to political ac-
tors. Moral shocks occur “when an event or situation raises
such a sense of outrage in people that they become inclined
toward political action, even in the absence of a network of
contacts” (Jasper and Poulsen 1995, 498). These are trans-
formative junctures capable of converting fear or apathy into
anger,  or  personal grievance into action (Johnston 2014).
Moral shocks are subjective experiences that affect individu-
als in vastly differing ways, leading to political outrage in cer-
tain individuals, while leaving others completely unaffected.
Often, they take the form of individual experiences unrelated
to  broader  political  developments:  personal  incidences  of
racism or  perceived injustice  that  can trigger  more gener-
alised  political  outrage (McCauley  and Moskalenko 2017,
12–21). They can also be the unintended consequences of
political  developments  elsewhere.  The  Ruby  Ridge  killings
and the Waco Siege in the early 1990s marked a watershed
for many on the American far right; thereafter it was widely
held that opposition to the federal government was no longer
a question of political preference but one of survival in the
face of its violence (Kaplan 1997, 85). On other occasions,
moral  shocks are  deliberately  contrived by political  move-
ments to motivate their sympathisers. This can take the form
of propaganda, attuned to the particular sensitivities of the
supportive milieu, as in the case of a German lone-actor ter-
rorist who attacked US soldiers after viewing a jihadist pro-
paganda film on YouTube which purported to show US sol-
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diers  raping  Iraqi  women  (Böckler,  Hoffmann,  and  Zick
2015).
In the German dyad case, two moral shocks occurred at
different phases of the radicalisation process, the first gener-
ating a general desire to commit violence, the second rein-
forcing the former and triggering the actual organising of an
attack. The publication of the Mohammed cartoons in Sep-
tember 2005 deeply angered Ahmad, and he was involved in
local protests against them in February 2006. His outrage
contributed to his gradual shift from deep jihadi convictions
to action (Doc1: 16). The second trigger was the killing of al-
Zarqawi in Iraq in June 2006. Both Ahmad and Hassan were
avowed admirers of al-Zarqawi and his death had a deep im-
pact on them (Doc1: 13). Hassan stated that this led them
to hasten their  plans for the attack. In the other cases of
dyadic  radicalisation,  we  have  not  identified  any  distinct
morals shocks which triggered either the radicalisation or the
actual attack. However, this might be because of our reliance
on secondary rather than primary sources for these cases.
The San Bernardino couple had radicalised over an extended
timeframe, in the course of which a more generalised sense
of outrage at Western policies towards the Islamic world ac-
cumulated. The Tsarnaev brothers (especially Tamerlan) were
opposed to US foreign policy but the available data does not
highlight any individual turning point that could be classed
as a moral shock. 
4.5. Indirect Encouragement Cues
Indirect encouragement cues are critical triggers in the later
stages of radicalisation and in the immediate lead-up to at-
tacks. They may take the form of attacks by other militants,
whom the perpetrators seek to emulate, or direct calls by ji-
hadist leaders for sympathisers to commit attacks on general
or specific  targets (Malthaner and Lindekilde 2017). Mes-
sages such as the one issued in September 2014 by ISIS
spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, calling for follow-
ers to kill American and European citizens wherever they can
(Hegghammer and Nesser  2015),  provide a form of  carte
blanche justification for ISIS sympathizers to carry out any
form of attack, without ever actually engaging with ISIS itself.
Other attacks can also serve as indirect encouragement cues
inspiring  would-be-attackers  to  emulate  them  (Abelson
1972). This imitation can partially  explain the clustering in
space and time of similar forms of attacks, such as, the re-
cent wave of Salafi jihadist attacks with knives or motor vehi-
cles  in  Nice,  Berlin,  Barcelona/Cambrils,  and  London  in
2016 and 2017. These cues also serve as a form of certifi-
cation,  reassuring  would-be  attackers  of  the  legitimacy  of
their plans, in the absence of more elaborate group encour-
agement. 
In the German case, Ahmad had discovered a fatwa by Abu
Mohammad al-Maqdisi calling on all Muslims to avenge the
Mohammed  cartoons  (Doc1:  28).  Although  he  already
seemed determined to vent his anger over the cartoons and
endorsed militant forms of action (Doc2: 26, 129), the al-
Maqdisi fatwa probably reinforced his belief in the righteous-
ness of a violent attack. Ahmad deliberately used these ex-
ternal calls for violence to encourage his less convinced co-
conspirator  to  stay  motivated  (Doc1:  16).  Much  less  is
known about the San Bernardino attackers’ online activities,
as Farook systematically deleted their computer data the day
before the attack (Medina et al. 2015). However, given that
they had both expressed a long-term interest in jihad, it is al-
most certain that they would have had encountered the pop-
ular pronouncements by al-Awlaki and al-Adnani calling for
attacks in the United States. Yet, the selected target, Farook’s
workplace and colleagues, had no symbolic resonance (un-
like the Garland attacks) and a limited maximum potential
number of casualties (unlike the Boston bombing). Finally,
no immediate trigger or indirect encouragement cue is evi-
dent in the Tsarnaev case. Dzhokhar had downloaded the ar-
ticle “Make a Bomb in The Kitchen of Your Mom” from al-
Qaeda’s  Inspire magazine  and other  material  by  al-Awlaki
(Jacobs, Filipov, and Wen 2013), but there is no evidence
that any specific text or pronouncement by Salafi jihadist ac-
tors moved them to action. Although the data is not com-
prehensive, the absence of the kind of consistent indirect en-
couragement cues that are found in most instances of lone-
actor  radicalisation  (Lindekilde,  Malthaner,  and  O’Connor
2018), suggests that trigger mechanisms might be found in
the interpersonal dynamic within the dyadic relationship.
5. Conclusion
Cases of dyadic violent radicalisation are too rare to identify
any strong recurrent patterns. However, this article has re-
vealed that as a phenomenon it has some distinct features.
Like  lone  actors,  dyads  are  not  completely  isolated  from
broader radical milieus and networks, and their progressive
radicalisation can be analysed through their online and off-
line engagement with these social environments, and by ex-
amining their  relational dynamics of withdrawal and social
isolation. Yet, in contrast to lone actors, the dyad in itself, as
a function of the intense relationship between the two indi-
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viduals involved, generates a powerful internal dynamic that
shapes processes of radicalisation. 
This internal dynamic is not simply the case of a dominant
individual exerting their influence on a more susceptible one.
To some extent, this does of course occur, as the case in
Germany highlights. But the interpersonal dynamics are far
subtler  and  more  complex  than  a  simple  dominant
leader/compliant follower relationship. Our cases show that
even the ostensibly dominant individual of the dyad, despite
being capable in terms of technical knowledge and ideologi-
cal motivation, are unlikely to carry out an attack alone, with-
out the moral support of another person. The functional role
of this relationship is not necessarily logistical or technical
assistance; as lone actors show, violent attacks can be pre-
pared and carried out by individuals with little or no outside
help. Rather, the crucial  role of  these dyadic  relationships
seems to lie in the fact that they can help certain individuals
to move from ideas and abstract plans towards violent action
and sustain commitment during attack preparations over an
extended period of time.  
The cases examined show that some elements of radicali-
sation  occurred  in  online  settings. This  echoes  the  over-
whelming consensus that contemporary radicalisation com-
prises  both on and offline features (Lindekilde, Malthaner,
and O’Connor 2018; Conway and McInerney 2008). While
the firm differentiation between online and offline has been
rejected as oversimplified false dichotomy (Gill et al. 2015,
35), there has been a tendency to overstate the centrality of
the role of online radicalisation (Weimann 2014, 1). This is
arguably related to the relative ease of retrospectively uncov-
ering online behaviour compared to the challenges inherent
in the wider investigation of interpersonal offline interactions.
Indeed in related research on lone actor radicalisation, only
one case, that of Roshonara Choudhry, could be plausibly
described as having occurred largely online (Malthaner et al.
2017, 101; Gill et al. 2015, 26–27). In the German bombing
case, the attackers were not radicalised online; rather they
used the internet as a means of maintaining their motivation
by sharing videos and seeking out fatwas that justified the
actions they already planned to undertake. We argue that the
predominant driver of their radicalisation was online interac-
tion but the intensity of the ties within the dyad, some of
which – due to their geographical separation in two different
cities – did occur online. 
In conclusion, instances of dyadic radicalisation should be
considered as part of a broader spectrum of radicalisation
ranging from lone actors to small groups, albeit with certain
particularities related to the intensity of the dyadic relation-
ship. This  presents  challenges  in  the  interdiction  of  dyad
based attacks: when the trigger for action comes from within
the dyadic relationship, and not from external, indirect en-
couragement cues, the timing and target of attacks becomes
less predictable. On the other hand, poor operational secu-
rity in communications between the two individuals in the
dyad, online or offline, could potentially render their plot vul-
nerable to detection by intelligence agencies or by people in
their immediate social environment such as family members
or housemates.
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